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JURISDICTION MEANS JURISDICTION NOT CLAIMS-
PROCESSING: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S FLAWED 
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Through attempts to implement multiple asylum bans, the zero 
tolerance policy, the  public charge rule, and, most recently, the 
Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), the Trump administration has 
arguably made its message clear: immigrants are not welcome.1 The 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A in Political Science, B.B.A, in Management, Loyola University 
Chicago, 2013. A sincere thank you to my former immigrant clients for encouraging 
me to embark on a journey I didn’t always envision for myself and to all the 
immigration attorneys I have had the honor and privilege of working with. Thanks to 
them, I learned that logic and compassion are not mutually exclusive. A special 
thank you to Clinical Lecturer Victoria Carmona for her commentary on Pereira 
litigation and to Professor Morris for giving Chicago-Kent students the opportunity 
to publish.  
1
  See Priyanka Boghani, A Guide to Some Major Trump Administration 
Immigration Policies 10(2019),https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-guIde-
to-some-major-trump-administration-immigration-policies. See also: Joel Rose, 




Gomez: Jurisdiction Means Jurisdiction Not Claims-Processing: the Sevent
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
administration’s constant efforts to change immigration law and policy 
have led to prolonged detention, denaturalization, family separation, 
and the extreme traumatization of immigrants.2 Given the 
administration’s constant attacks on the immigrant community, 
advocates unquestionably saw a sliver of hope when the Supreme 
Court decided Pereira v. Sessions.3  
In Pereira, the Supreme Court held that a government-issued 
notice to appear not specifying the time and place of  removal 
proceedings does not meet the statutory definition of a notice to appear 
(“NTA”), under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 and therefore, does not trigger what is 
known as the “stop-time rule.”4 The decision seemed straightforward 
in one sense: a notice failing to list the time and place of a hearing 
could not “stop time” and therefore prevent a noncitizen from accruing 
the required physical presence to cancel his removal from the country.5  
However, immigrant advocates saw the potential jurisdictional 
ramifications involved: if, as the Pereira court declared, an NTA not 
listing the date and time of the hearing was an invalid charging 
document or summons, then, how could the immigration court vest its 
jurisdiction over a noncitizen’s case? Therefore, in direct response to 
the Court’s decision, immigrant advocates across the country 
challenged and successfully terminated the removal proceedings of at 
least 9,000 immigrants in the months immediately following the 
                                                 
2
 In June 2018, the Trump administration announced plans to denaturalize at 
least 2000 citizens who were suspected of committing fraud. Ingrid Rojas Contreras, 




While the federal government estimated that about 3,000 children were 
separated from their families as a result of the Trump administration’s zero-tolerance 
policy, a new report estimates that at least 700 children were separated from their 
families before the policy was formally announced. See Miriam Jordan, Family 
Separation May Have Hit Thousands More Migrant Children Than Reported, 
(January 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/family-separation-
trump-administration-migrants.html. 
4 
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105(2018). 
5 
Lonny Hoffman, Pereira’s Aftershock’s 61 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1,5 
(2019). 
2
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decision.6 Advocates’ argument was seemingly simple. By statute, an 
immigration court vests its subject matter jurisdiction over a case by 
serving a charging document (i.e. a notice to appear) and therefore, the 
Court’s decision that an incomplete NTA not listing the date and place 
of a hearing, was not valid, could be interpreted as denying 
immigration courts’ jurisdiction whenever an incomplete notice was 
served upon a noncitizen. However, this seemingly simple argument 
premised on statutory interpretation has left lower courts and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) alike struggling to 
reach a consensus on how to properly interpret Pereira.7  
To determine how broadly or narrowly Pereira should be 
construed, both lower courts and the Supreme Court must inevitably 
address numerous questions. First, courts must decide whether 
immigration court proceedings initiated with a defective NTA are 
invalidated due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Secondly, courts 
must address whether a two-step process in which a subsequent notice 
of hearing containing the missing time and place can, in essence, 
“cure” the initial defective notice.8 Still, courts must determine who 
can avail themselves of Pereira’s benefits.9 Is Pereira only applicable 
to those who are currently in removal proceedings initiated by 
defective NTAs?10 Does Pereira allow for anyone with a final removal 
order to benefit from being able to challenge an immigration court’s 
jurisdiction over their case?11 Furthermore, if a Pereira claim is 
allowed, must a person raising such a claim show they were prejudiced 
after receiving a defective NTA?12 While courts have begun to address 
                                                 
6
 Reade Levinson & Cristina Cooke, US Courts Abruptly Tossed 9000 




Hoffman, supra note 5. 
8
 Hoffman, Geoffrey, A., Litigation Post-Pereira: Where are We Now? 2 
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some of these issues, rather than providing clear answers, lower 
courts’ and the BIA’s decisions have further complicated the analysis 
in answering these questions.13  
Shortly after the Pereira decision, the Board, attempting to 
provide both immigration courts and attorneys with much needed 
guidance on Pereira’s implications, limited the decision to 
cancellation of removal cases and held that Pereira only addressed the 
issue of whether the stop-time rule was triggered by a defective notice 
to appear and that immigration courts still had jurisdiction when they 
issued defective NTAs.14 Therefore, immigrant advocates could not 
challenge immigration courts’ jurisdiction whenever a noncitizen 
received a notice not containing the date and time of their removal 
proceeding. In addition, the Board held that as long as the courts later 
issued a notice of hearing listing the missing information, the 
immigration court could vest jurisdiction over the individual’s case.15 
The Board, however, did not explicitly state Pereira has no 
jurisdictional ramifications.16  
As a result, immigration attorneys continued challenging cases 
initiated by defective NTAs, arguing for the dismissal or termination 
of cases based on the immigration court’s failure to vest jurisdiction.17  
They relied on 8 CFR § 1003.14(a), which provides that the 
immigration court’s jurisdiction “vests” when a “charging document” 
is filed with the immigration court to argue that NTAs not listing the 
time and place are not proper charging documents under 8 CFR § 
1003.13 and therefore cannot vest the immigration court’s jurisdiction 
over the noncitizen’s case.18 
Lower courts’ reviews of the challenges brought after Bermudez-
Cota, however, only served to complicate everyone’s understanding of 
Pereira and immigration law in general. Until recently, there was a 











Levinson & Cooke, supra note 6.
 
18
 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2018). 
4
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circuit split on whether a Pereira claim, that a defective notice could 
not assert jurisdiction over an individual’s claim, was valid.19 
Additionally, courts of appeals are still split on many of the questions 
that inevitably arise in answering the first question. 
Following the Board’s attempt to clarify Pereira’s impact in 
Bermudez-Cota, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth circuits deferred to the 
Board’s rejection of the jurisdictional argument.20 The Eleventh 
Circuit, in ruling on a motion for stay of removal, broke this trend, 
reasoning it was not required to defer to the BIA because the agency’s 
holding was “based on an unreasonable interpretation of the governing 
statutes and regulations.”21  
The Seventh Circuit, in Santiago-Ortiz v. Barr agreed with the 
Eleventh Circuit and rejected both of  Bermudez-Cota’s 
conclusions:(1) that Pereira was limited to the question of whether the 
stop-time rule is triggered and (2) that the two-step process of serving 
a deficient NTA and subsequently issuing a notice of hearing with the 
missing date and time was sufficient to be Pereira compliant.22 The 
court rejected what it considered to be Bermudez-Cota’s 
oversimplification of Pereira saying: “Pereira is not a one-way, one-
day train ticket,” and added that the Board “brushed too quickly over 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira.” 23 
                                                 
19
  Katy Lewis, Michelle Mendez, Victoria Neilson, and Rebecca Scholtz, 
Practice Advisory: Pereira v. Sessions—Updated Strategies and Considerations 
20
 See Banegas Gomez v. Barr, No. 15-3269, 2019 WL 1768914, at *6–8 (2d 
Cir. Apr. 23, 2019) (holding that jurisdiction vests with the immigration court when 
the initial notice to appear does not specify the time and place of the proceedings, 
but notices of hearing served later include that information); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 
913 F.3d 1158, 1159–62 (9th Cir. 2019) (same); Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 
F.3d 305, 312–15 (6th Cir. 2018) (same). 
21
 Duran - Ortega v. United States AG, No. 18-14563-D, 2018 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 33531 (11th Cir. Nov. 29, 2018)(citing United States v. Zapata-Cortinas, 
2018 WL 4770868, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. 2018); United States v. Virgen-Ponce, 320 
F.Supp.3d 1164, 1166 (E.D. Wash. 2018), but noting other district courts have 
disagreed. See, e.g., United States v. Romero Colindres, 2018 WL 5084877, at *2 
(N.D. Ohio 2018)). 
22
 Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019). 
23 
Id. at 961-962. 
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The Seventh Circuit then considered what should result from 
finding an NTA violated statutory requirements and was therefore 
noncompliant with Pereira.24 The court explained that while 
“jurisdiction vests” upon the service of an  NTA, “jurisdiction” 
should not be understood as referring to “jurisdiction” “in the same 
sense that complete diversity or the existence of a federal question is 
for a district court.”25 Instead, the court interpreted the question of 
“jurisdiction” as a “claims-processing rule,” which it defined as a 
rule “seek[ing] to promote the orderly progress of litigation by 
requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain 
specified times.”26 The court noted that failure to comply with a 
claims-processing rule may result in termination of a  noncitizen’s 
removal hearing, meaning a noncitizen could potentially remain in 
the country.27 However, a hearing would only be terminated if a 
noncitizen timely objected to a defective notice.28 Without a timely 
objection, the noncitizen, would waive or forfeit his objection.29 
The Seventh Circuit’s new approach in interpreting the issuance 
of a defective NTA as a violation of a claims-processing rule rather 
than a jurisdictional violation has provided immigration attorneys 
with a different avenue to contest defective NTAs. Unfortunately, 
however, the Seventh Circuit has relied on  the reasoning in Ortiz-
Santiago to deny noncitizens’ petitions of review without 
necessarily delineating what constitutes a timely objection to a 
defective NTA.30 Should a noncitizen make this “timely objection” in 
his initial cancellation of removal request before the immigration 
                                                 
24
 Id. at 963. 
25
 Id. (citing Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011)). 
26 




 Id. at 958. 
29 
Id. at 964. 
30 
See Vidinski v. Barr, No. 18-3413, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 32169 (7th Cir. 
Oct. 28, 2019); Vyloha v. Barr, 929 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2019); Shojaeddini v. Barr, 
781 F. App’x 545 (7th Cir. 2019); Vyloha v. Barr, 929 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2019). 
6
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judge? Should he object to the defective notice after his application for 
cancellation is denied and he appeals to the Board?  
Without addressing what constitutes a timely objection, the 
Seventh Circuit has quickly rejected numerous petitions for review 
of Board decisions holding that the noncitizen’s objections were 
untimely.31 Importantly, the time element would not be so significant 
had the court agreed that serving a defective NTA implicates a lack 
of jurisdiction over a case allowing an individual to bring this issue 
before a court at virtually any point–unlike a claims-processing 
violation. Furthermore, a claims-processing violation, as noted in 
Ortiz-Santiago, would allow a court to simply dismiss a noncitizen’s 
challenge to a defective notice, on the grounds that the challenge 
was not timely.  
Overall, while the Seventh Circuit correctly concluded the 
notice served on the noncitizen was defective and properly 
distinguished the case before it from Pereira, its reasoning in 
denying the noncitizen’s petition for review is ultimately flawed. 
The distinction between a claims-processing rule and jurisdiction 
matters. Defective notices are not clearly merely a violation of a 
claims-processing rule as the Seventh Circuit suggests, especially 
given ambiguities in the statutes delineating what must be included 
in an NTA and how immigration courts vest jurisdiction.32 Ruling 
that defective notices are violations of claims-processing not only 
potentially diminishes the opportunity of noncitizens to contest their 
removal hearing based on government error or idleness, but also 
ignores established Supreme Court precedent indicating statutes 
should be read in favor of the noncitizen.33  
This note will review the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ortiz-
Santiago v. Barr and its approach to Pereira. The first section of this 
note will provide a brief overview of immigration law pertaining to the 
issues involved in Pereira and Ortiz-Santiago; including explanations 




Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 
L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (noting jurisdiction is a word of many meanings).
 
33
 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). 
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of how the government initiates the process of removing a noncitizen 
from the United States, how someone in that situation can apply for a 
form of relief that would prevent his removal from the country, and the 
role the stop-time rule plays in the removal process.  
The second section will provide an analysis of Pereira as it relates 
to the stop time rule and the potential ramifications the decision has on 
noncitizens’ ability to cancel their removal from the country. The third 
section will provide a summary and analysis of Ortiz-Santiago. Lastly, 
the fourth section will discuss the Seventh Circuit’s approach to 




A. The Initiation of Removal Proceedings Through Notices to 
Appear 
 
Article 1 Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants the government 
the power to establish a uniform rule on Naturalization.34 To carry out 
these duties, 8 U.S.C.§1227 gives the government the power to initiate 
removal proceedings against noncitizens who are undocumented or 
may have lost their status in the United States.35  
Removal proceedings, commonly and previously referred to as 
deportation proceedings, are administrative proceedings held to 
determine whether noncitizens are can or should be removed from the 
United States and whether they are eligible for any relief under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).36 A person is considered 
removable from the country if he or she: entered the United States 
without being properly admitted or inspected by an immigration 
officer; was present in the country unlawfully or stayed in the country 
beyond the time permitted by his or her visa; or committed crimes the 
                                                 
34
 Edzie, Louisa, Pereira v. Sessions and the Future of Deportation 
Proceedings, IMMIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS L. REVIEW 1, 1 (2019). 
35
 Id. at 1. 
36
 Removal proceedings were previously and are still commonly referred to as 
deportation proceedings or exclusion proceedings. 
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government has determined makes a noncitizen deportable or 
inadmissible such as having been part of the Nazi or Communist 
parties or having an intent to overthrow the government.37 
To initiate removal proceedings, the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) issues administrative summons or charging 
documents referred to as a notices to appear (“NTAs”).38 Under 8 
U.S.C § 1229, an NTA is a written notice served on noncitizens listing 
the nature of the proceedings against the noncitizen, the legal authority 
under which the proceedings can be initiated and carried out, the 
conduct that is arguably in violation of the law, the charges against the 
noncitizen, and the statutory provisions that the noncitizen has 
allegedly violated.39Additionally, as held in Pereira, the NTA must list 
the time and date of removal hearing.40  
While there has been much debate about what constitutes a valid 
NTA, as the Board decided in Bermudez-Cota, a decision which all 
circuits have followed as of this date, the government can still comply 
with the Pereira requirement that a valid NTA must list the date and 
time of a noncitizen’s hearing if it then issues a notice of hearing 
(“NOH”) listing these details initially omitted in the NTA.41 Courts 
                                                 
37
 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (1996) (“The term ‘removable’ means—(A) in the 
case of an [noncitizen]not admitted to the United States, that the [noncitizen] is 
inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, or (B) in the case of an [noncitizen] 
admitted to the United States, that the [noncitizen] is deportable under section 1227 
of this title”). 
38
 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2019) (“Initiation of removal proceedings”); see also 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2019) (“At the conclusion of the proceeding the 
immigration judge shall decide whether a [noncitizen] is removable from the United 
States. The determination of the immigration judge shall be based only on the 
evidence produced at the hearing”). 
39
 See Edzie, supra note 32, at 1, citing 8 U.S. Code § 1229. 
40
 Pereira v. Sessions,585U.S. 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).  
41 
Matter of Bermudez-Cota,27 I&N Dec. 441. See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 
F.3d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2019) petition for cert. pending, No. 19-475 (filed Oct. 
7, 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2019) reh’g denied 
(July 18, 2019) petition for cert. pending No.19-510 (filed Oct. 16, 2019); Ortiz-
Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983 (8th 
Cir. 2019); Nkomo v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 930 F.3d 129, 132-134 (3d 
9
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have referred to this as a two-step process of providing the noncitizen 
with the information required.42Importantly, a noncitizen’s failure to 
appear before the judge on either  the date and time that is listed on the 
NTA can result in an immigration judge ordering him removed in 
absentia.43  
Immigration judges’ decisions can then be appealed to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA).44 Should a noncitizen disagree with the 
both the immigration court’s and the Board’s decision on his case, he 
may appeal to federal courts.45  
 
B. Cancellation of Removal 
 
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, grants the U.S. Attorney 
General the discretion to “cancel removal” and adjust the status of 
certain noncitizens, if they meet certain statutory eligibility 
requirements.46 Allowing noncitizens to request that the government 
cancel their removal (i.e., their deportation from the country),is known 
as a petition for cancellation of removal. 
Despite what seems to be the harsh consequences of many 
immigration laws, something still remains true: at least in theory, 
cancellation of removal, allowing noncitizens to request that the 
                                                 
Cir. 2019); United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 359-366 (4th Cir. 2019); Pierre-
Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 688-691 (5th Cir. 2019);  Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y 
Gen., 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019); Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1, 5 (1st 
Cir. 2019); Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2019). 
42
 See Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez & Capula-Cortes, 27 I&N Dec. 520  
(BIA 2019)(holding that a deficient notice to appear lacking the time and place of a 
noncitizen’s initial removal hearing is perfected when the subsequent notice of 
hearing is sent to the noncitizen specifying the information.). 
43
 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (1996). 
44 
INA § 242 8 U.S.C §1252 (“Judicial review of orders of removal”); Reyes 
Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 135 S. Ct. 2150, 1253 (2015).  
45
 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (d) (1996). 
46 
8 U.S.C.S. § 1229b (b) (1) (1996). 
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government, in essence, cancel their removal, remains one of the most 
generous forms of immigration relief available to noncitizens.47  
Of course, however, the generosity of this law, is potentially 
outweighed by the strict requirements noncitizens must meet and serve 
to limit the number of people who can pursue this form of relief. 
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229, cancellation of removal is available to legal 
permanent residents and non-legal permanent residents.48 referring to 
individuals who are here as unauthorized immigrants or are present in 
the United States with a visa, but have not applied to permanently live 
in the United States.49  
A legal permanent resident who has been placed in removal 
proceedings must prove: (1) he was admitted to the country as a legal 
permanent resident for at least five years; (2) he has continuously 
resided in the United States for seven years, regardless of his status; 
and (3) he has not been convicted of any crimes.50 Similarly, a non-
legal permanent resident must appear before an immigration judge and 
establish:(1) he has been physically present in the United states for at 
least ten years immediately preceding the date of application;(2) he 
had good moral character during the period of continuous presences; 
(3) he had not been convicted of certain offenses; and (4) his removal 
would cause extreme and unusual hardship to his legal permanent 
resident (“LPR”) or U.S. citizen spouse, parent or child.51 
 
C. Stop-Time Rule 
 
The same statute that grants the government the power to cancel 
the removal of nonpermanent residents meeting the statutory 
provisions delineated previously also provides that the continuous 
physical presence requirement “shall be deemed to end . . . when the 
                                                 
47
 Should an applicant be able to prove he  
48
 Legal permanent resident refers to  
49
 8 U.S.C.S. § 1229b. 
50 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
51
 INA § 240A(b)(1); 8 USC 1229 (b)(1). 
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[noncitizen] is served a notice to appear under 1229(a).”52 This is 
known as the stop-time rule.  
To understand how this rule works, consider the following 
example. Maria Sanchez, lived in the United States without leaving 
from April 1, 2008 until 2018. In 2017, she received a Notice to 
Appear telling her she should appear before an immigration judge. 
Given that she has been in the United States since 2008, and in this 
example, it is currently 2018, it seems clear that she met the 10-year 
physical presence requirement that would allow her to request that the 
government cancel her removal. However, Maria, cannot, in fact 
request cancellation of removal. Although she has lived in the United 
States for more than ten years, she stopped accumulating time towards 
the 10 year requirement when she received the NTA. Therefore, the 
government would consider her to have lived in the United States for 
only nine years—the nine years she lived in the United States prior to 
the government ordering her to appear before an immigration judge.  
For quite some time, the government had been issuing incomplete 
NTAs that did not specify all the details required by statute. Lower 
courts reviewed challenges claiming that NTAs not containing the time 
a place a noncitizen should appear before an immigration judge were 
invalid for failing to abide by the requirements set forth by statute and 
therefore could not be said to allow an immigration court to assert 
jurisdiction over an individuals’ case. However, lower courts’ failure 
to reach a consensus on this question ultimately led to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Pereira, where the Court examined a notice to 
appear that merely “ordered [a nonresident] to appear before an 
immigration judge in Boston on a date to be set at a time to be set.”53 
 
D. Does a notice to appear vest jurisdiction with the immigration 
court?   
 
To fully understand Pereira’s implications, it is important to 
understand immigrant advocates’ jurisdictional argument. Jurisdiction 
                                                 
52
 8 U.S.C.S. § 1229 b(d). 
53 
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2112 (2018). 
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refers to a court’s adjudicatory capacity, which is, its subject-matter 
jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction.54 The “‘first and fundamental 
question’ of jurisdiction  applies not only to the appellate courts, but 
also to the ‘the courts from which the records comes[,]’ and it is one 
that ‘the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not 
otherwise suggested.’”55 
Congress arguably established subject matter jurisdiction through 
the INA which grants the Attorney General the authority and 
responsibility to conduct removal proceedings,56 and directed  that 
“immigration judge[s] shall conduct” those proceedings.57  
While the INA does not address how jurisdiction vests with the 
immigration court, an Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(“EOIR”) regulation addresses the issue stating that: “jurisdiction 
vests, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when 
a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court” by the 
department. 58 The regulation continues by defining a “charging 
document” as “the written instrument which initiates a proceeding 
before an Immigration Judge” . . . “includ[ing] a Notice to Appear, a 
Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge, and  Notice of Intention to 
Rescind and Request for Hearing . . . .”59 Since filing an NTA initiates 
removal proceedings and by statute an immigration court vests 
jurisdiction through the issuance of a charging document, which 
includes an NTA, the immigration court can be said to  vest 
jurisdiction upon the filing of an NTA.60  
 
                                                 
54  
55 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)(quoting Great 
Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900)). 
56
 INA § 240 (2011). 
57 
In re Castro-Tum , 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (B.I.A. May 17, 2018);INA§ 
240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1)(2006).
 
58 
8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a).  
59
 8 C.F.R. 1003.13. 
60
 See Matter of Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I&N Dec. 43, 44 (BIA 2012)( finding that 
“[o]nce a notice to appear has been properly filed, with the Immigration Court, 
jurisdiction vests”).  
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II. PEREIRA V. SESSIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON REMOVAL 
 
The Supreme Court reviewed the issue of whether a notice to 
appear that is issued to a noncitizen in removal proceedings triggers 
the stop-time rule and would therefore make him ineligible to apply 
for cancellation of removal.61 In Pereira v. Sessions, a Brazilian citizen 
overstayed his visitor visa in the United States.62 On May 31, 2006, he 
was served with a notice to appear by DHS.63 The notice indicated 
Pereira had to appear before an immigration judge, but did not specify 
a time or place for the hearing.64 More than one year later, the 
immigration court mailed Pereira a notice listing his hearing for 
October 31, 2007.65 However, the notice was sent to the wrong address 
and he did not receive it.66 Pereira, not aware that he had a hearing 
scheduled, did not attend the hearing and the immigration judge 
ordered him to be removed in absentia.67 He did not learn of the in 
absentia removal notice until 2013.68  
The immigration judge rescinded the in absentia order and 
reopened proceedings.69 The immigration judge denied the application 
for cancellation of removal finding that the notice stopped the accrual 
of continuous physical presence.70 The noncitizen then appealed his 
case to the BIA. Relying on Matter of Camarillo, which held that 
“service of a notice to appear triggers the ‘stop-time’ rule, regardless 
of whether the date and time of the hearing have been included in the 
document,” the BIA upheld the immigration judge’s decision.71 Again, 
                                                 
61 
Pereira, 138 S. Ct. 2105 at 2112. 
62 
Id. at 2107. 
63 
Id. at 2112.  
64
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the noncitizen appealed, this time to the First Circuit, where his 
petition for review was denied on the basis that, as an immigration 
court, part of an agency, is owed deference in its interpretation of the 
statute delineating the requirements of a valid notice to appear.72 The 
case went to the Supreme Court to resolve a circuit split.73 
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a document 
labeled “notice to appear,” that does not specify the time and/or place 
of the removal proceedings, triggers the stop-time rule.74 In an opinion 
authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held, 8 to 1, that “[a] 
notice that does not inform a non-citizen when and where to appear for 
removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229 (a)’ 
and therefore does not trigger the stop-time rule.”75 
The court reached its decision by looking at the statute listing the 
requirements of a valid notice to appear. Under 8 U.S.C 1229(a), an 
NTA is required to list “[t]he time and place the [removal] proceedings 
will be held.”76 The Court then considered surrounding statutes to 
understand the relationship between the statutory requirements of 
notices to appear and those of provision requiring the opportunity to 
secure counsel, for example.77 After an evaluation of the surrounding 
statutes, including the statute indicating who the requirements for a 
non-citizen to secure counsel, the Court concluded that it made 
practical sense for the notice to be required to “specify the time and 
place the noncitizen, and his counsel, must appear at the removal 
hearing.”78 The Court reasoned its conclusion followed “inescapably 
and unambiguously” from “the plain text, the statutory context, and 
common sense.”79 Determining whether the Court’s decision was fact 
specific, however, is something that is still being debated. 
                                                 
72 
Id. at 2128. 
73 
Id. at 2113. 
74
 Id. at 2110. 
75
 Id. at 2107. 
76
 Pereira,138 S. Ct. at 2114, (quoting 8 U.S.C.1229(a)(1)(G)(i) (2006)). 
77
 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2109. 
78
 Id. at 211415. 
79
 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018). 
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A. Does Pereira have jurisdictional ramifications?  
 
Justice Sotomayor arguably intended to implicate all immigration 
courts’ jurisdiction explaining what constituted a valid NTA. While 
seemingly clear at first glance, there has been much debate about 
whether this is true. 
As previously stated, immigrant advocates, proponents of an 
expansive Pereira interpretation argue that “[a] notice that does not 
inform a noncitizen when and where to appear for removal 
proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229 (a).’” The 
argument is that “a document isn’t a notice to appear if it doesn’t have 
a time and place on it, [and therefore]cannot be a charging document. 
And without a valid charging document, jurisdiction never vests in the 
immigration court.”80 The natural next question is just what type of 
jurisdiction can an immigration court assert: is a court asserting 
personal or subject matter jurisdiction when it serves an NTA? 
In an unpublished opinion, the BIA stated that immigration courts, 
like Article III courts must have both personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction.81 However, under 8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a) “[j]urisdiction 
vests, and proceedings before an immigration judge commence, when 
a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court by 
the Service.”82 This regulation concerns whether a particular case is 
properly before an immigration court. The idea that a charging 
document needs to be filed with an immigration court or else it lacks 
authority to make decisions on the issues raised before it describes the 
concept of subject-matter jurisdiction.83 This is the concept the 
Supreme Court described saying that “courts have a duty to ensure that 
                                                 
80
 Kit Johnson, Pereira v. Sessions: A Jurisdictional Surprise for Immigration 
Courts, 50 Columbia Human Rights L. Review 1, 5 (2019). 
81 
Id. at 5 n. 4 (citing Marco v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-761, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 108337 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 12, 201 0).  
82 
8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a)(February 28,2003). 
83
 Johnson, supra note 81. 
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their jurisdiction ‘defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded.’”84 
Despite this seemingly clear language, scholars, courts, and even the 
Board have all reached different conclusions regarding this question 
on numerous occasions.  
In response to the notion that the court never mentioned 
jurisdiction, proponents of an expansive Pereira reading argue that a 
narrow interpretation baldly ignores what the Court did say as the 
court clearly spoke about 1229(a)’s requirements.85 The Court, in 
Pereira, rejected the notion advanced by the government and dissent 
indicating the statute is not worded in definitional terms, saying: 
 
Section 1229(a)[] does speak in definitional terms, at least with 
respect to the “ time and place at which the proceedings will be 
held”: It specifically provides that the notice described under 
paragraph (1) is “referred to as a ‘notice to appear,’” which in 
context is quintessential definitional language. It then defines that 
term as a “written notice” that , as relevant here, “specif[ies] the 
time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.” 
Thus when the term notice to appear” is used elsewhere int eh 
statutory section, including as the trigger for the stop-time rule, it 
carries with is the substantive time-and-place criteria required by 
1229(a).86 
 
The entire passage is clearly discussing the requirements of 1229(a).87 
Additionally, the majority opinion clearly stated that 1229 (a)’s 
requirements are applicable to all notices to appear in response to the 
Justice Alito’s argument that the statute is better understood as 
defining what a “complete’ notice to appear should include rather than 
what a defective notice to appear” deprives it of “essential character as 









 Id. at 31. 
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a notice to appear.”88 Even if incomplete, the notice to appear is still a 
notice to appear.  
 
1. Arguments in Favor of a Narrow Interpretation 
 
On the other side of the spectrum, is the opinion that a defective 
notice “ does not bear on the immigration court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction” since Congress “has not expressly tethered the exercise of 
jurisdiction for satisfaction of the separate statutory requirements for 
notice to appear.”89 The reasoning employed in reaching such a 
conclusion is that the notice to appear “is akin to a summons or 
citation that is used in state and federal civil cases to notify civil 
defendants that they have been sued or to the type of charging 
document that is used in criminal proceedings.”90 
Critics of a broad interpretation, including anything beyond the 
context of removal cases rely on two main arguments. First, they 
argue, the Supreme Court did not mention jurisdiction in its decision. 
In other words, the Court did not hold that all notices to appear should 
be invalidated when they do not list that date and time of the hearing; 
and therefore, the case cannot be read so broadly. Additionally, courts 
adopting this approach have emphasized that the Pereira Court went 
out of its way to say it was only deciding a “narrow” question.91 In the 
same vein, the government and lower courts have emphasized the 
Court did not mention jurisdiction and therefore did not invalidate 
Pereira’s removal order for lack of jurisdiction.92  
Another main argument advocates for a narrow reading of Pereira 
advance is referred to as the actual notice objection.93 They essentially 
argue that if noncitizens receive actual notice of when and where the 












 Id. at 29. 
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removal hearings will be held, Pereira does not apply.94 In doing so, 
advocates distinguish many of the cases used to challenge removal 
proceedings initiated through  defective notices. While in Pereira, the 
noncitizen never received actual notice because the notice was sent to 
another address many noncitizens challenging their removal based on 
defective notices, did,  in fact receive their NTAs. The crux of the 
actual notice argument is that in delineating that a valid  NTA  must 
state the place and time, the Pereira Court was more concerned with 
noncitizen’s receiving notice, than with a notice listing every item 
listed in the statute.95 Many pre-Pereira cases upholding a two-step 
notice process in which a noncitizen is served with an NTA and then 
receives a notice of hearing listing the date and time have been cited 
by advocates of a narrow Pereira reading illustrate courts worry more 
about function than form in these cases.96  
 
2. Arguments in Favor of a Broad Interpretation 
  
The BIA, in an unpublished opinion, stated that immigration 
courts, like Article III courts must have both personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction.97 Under 8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a) “[j]urisdiction vests, 
and proceedings before an immigration judge commence, when 
a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court by 
the Service.”98 This regulation concerns whether a particular case is 
properly before an immigration court. The fact that a charging 
document needs to be filed with an immigration court or else it lacks 
authority to make decisions on the issues raised before it describes the 
concept of subject-matter jurisdiction.99 This is the concept the 
Supreme Court described saying that “courts have a duty to ensure that 








  Johnson, supra note 81, n. 4 citing Marco v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-761, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108337 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 12, 2010).  
98 
8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a) (2019). 
99 
Johnson, supra note 81, at 4. 
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their jurisdiction ‘defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded.” 100 
Nonetheless, scholars, courts, and even the Board have all reached 
different conclusions regarding this question on numerous occasions.  
 
B. The Board of Immigration Appeal’s Narrowing of Pereira in 
Bermudez-Cota  
 
Following Pereira, the Board issued a decision in Matter of 
Bermudez-Cota limiting Pereira to its facts and therefore denying 
challenges to immigration courts’ jurisdiction in removal cases when 
defective notices were issued.101 In Bermudez-Cota, the non-citizen 
was served with a notice to appear that did not include the time or 
place of the hearing.102 Just over a week later, the immigration court 
mailed him a notice of hearing that did include the date, time and place 
of the hearing.103 At his final hearing, Bermudez-Cota moved to either 
administratively close his proceedings or request a continuance to 
apply for adjustment of status.104 The immigration judge denied both 
the motion to administratively close the case and the application for 
adjustment of status and instead issued Bermudez-Cota an order for 
voluntary departure.105 Bermudez-Cota appealed the decision to the 
BIA arguing that the immigration court did not assert jurisdiction 
based on Pereira.106 
 The Board held that “a notice to appear that does not specify the 
time and place of a noncitizen’s initial removal hearing vests an 
Immigration Judge with jurisdiction over the removal proceedings and 
meets the requirements of section 239(a) of the Act, so long as a notice 
of hearing specifying this information is later sent to the [non-




Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I.&N. Dec. 441, 441, 2018 BIA LEXIS 31, 
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citizen].”107 The Board distinguished Bermudez-Cota’s situation from 
the one in Pereira highlighting that Bermudez-Cota had received a 
subsequent hearing notice unlike Pereira, and that Bermudez-Cota was 
“ not seeking cancellation of removal, and the ‘stop-time rule,’[was 
therefore] not at issue.”108 In reaching its conclusion that the 
subsequent issuance of a hearing notice that lists the date, time, and 
place of the hearing resolves potential jurisdictional issues involved 
with a defective notice to appear, the Board relied on many decisions 
that pre-date Pereira.109  
Furthermore, the Board did not base its conclusion on any 
statutory or regulatory authority.110 Rather, the court merely reasoned 
that Pereira involved a “distinct set of facts,” which did not include a 
subsequent notice of hearing.111 The Board made it clear that the Court 
in Pereira, did not indicate the noncitizen’s removal hearing was 
invalid or suggest that the proceedings should be terminated.112 
Instead, the Pereira Court remanded the case for further 
proceedings.113 Other than distinguishing Bermudez-Cota from 
Pereira, however, the Board did not base its conclusion on the 
jurisdictional issue in Pereira or any statute.114 
This decision has been criticized for its reliance on circuit court 
decisions issued prior to Pereira that embraced a “two-step” notice 
process.115 Furthermore, the decision has also been criticized for its 
reliance on the federal regulation governing NTAs rather than relying 
on the relevant statute defining what constitutes a proper NTA.116  
 
                                                 
107 
Id. at *16. 
108
 Id.  
109 













Hoffman, Geoffrey A., supra note 8, at 3.
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C. Federal Courts’ Rulings on Jurisdiction since Bermudez-Cota 
 
To date, all courts of appeals except for the DC circuit have 
considered whether an immigration court has jurisdiction when it 
issues a defective or incomplete NTA and have concluded that, despite 
Pereira’s holding, immigration courts do assert jurisdiction even with 
incomplete NTAs.117 While consistent in their denial of the claims, 
however, courts’ reasoning further complicates the issue. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit, in Karingithi v. Whitaker, 
emphasized that the immigration court’s jurisdiction is governed by 
regulation and not by statute and highlighted how neither the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Pereira nor the statutory definition of an NTA at § 
1229(a) address jurisdiction.118 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 
Pereira court relied upon the intersection of the statutory provisions 
dealing with the stop-time rule and the definition of an NTA. 
However, it found that the word “under” in the stop-time rule mattered 
only to the substantive time-and place requirements mandated by § 
1229(a) because that word  “provides the glue that bonds the stop-time 
rule to the substantive time-and-place requirements mandated by § 
1229(a),”11932 but “no such statutory glue bonds the Immigration 
Court’s jurisdiction to § 1229(a)’s requirements.” 120 Other circuits 
have also found there is no statutory basis to hold that immigration 
courts lack jurisdiction based on a defective NTA.    
                                                 
117
 Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2019) petition for 
cert. pending, No. 19-475 (filed Oct. 7, 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 
101, 112 (2d Cir. 2019) reh’g denied (July 18, 2019) petition for cert. pending 
No.19-510 (filed Oct. 16, 2019); Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 
2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 2019); Nkomo v. Attorney Gen. of United 
States, 930 F.3d 129, 132-134 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 
359-366 (4th Cir. 2019); Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 688-691 (5th Cir. 2019);  
Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019); Goncalves 
Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019); Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013, 
1018 (10th Cir. 2019). 
118
 Karingithi, 913 F.3d at 1161 
119
 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2117. 
120
 Karingithi, supra note, 118 at 1161. 
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Courts’ confusion regarding the proper interpretation of Pereira, 
is further highlighted by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Santos- v. 
Barr.121 Santos-Santos made a Pereira jurisdictional claim, arguing 
that his in absentia order should be rescinded and reopened since it the 
in absentia order was premised on a defective NTA.122 The NTA, did 
not list the date, time, and place of the hearing and therefore, he 
argued, the immigration judge had no jurisdiction to enter a removal 
order.123 Santos also claimed that he never received an NTA nor notice 
of hearing and that there was no evidence showing whether anyone did 
in fact try to serve him with a notice of hearing.”124 The Sixth Circuit 
nonetheless, rejected his jurisdictional challenge holding that Pereira 
was distinguishable from his case for two reasons.125 First, Pereira 
dealt with the narrow issue of whether the stop-time rule can be 
triggered by an NTA lacking the time and place of the hearing.126 
Secondly, Pereira dealt with statutory provisions that were not at issue 
in Santos’s case.127  
In stating that Pereira dealt with statutory provisions not at issue 
in Santos’s case, however, the Sixth Circuit  potentially erred. The 
court apparently believed that the regulation and the governing statutes 
referred to two different NTAs and stated: “it bears noting that the 
Notice to Appear in 8 C.F. R. 1003.13-14. is different from the NTA in 
8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1). 128 Therefore, courts’ inconsistent reasoning in 
concluding a defective NTA does not deprive immigration courts of 
jurisdiction should encourage attorneys to continue making the 
challenge. 
 
D. Seventh Circuit Precedent on Pereira Claims 
                                                 
121 
Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2019).
 
122 












Id. at 490. 
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The Seventh Circuit has addressed  issues other than whether a  
Pereira claim, that an incomplete notice is invalid and cannot assert 
jurisdiction, can be made. For example in, Herrera-Garcia v. Barr, the 
court considered when the claim could be made.129 Herrera-Garcia had 
been denied asylum along with the adjoining claims of withholding of 
removal and CAT relief, but during the petition for review from the 
Seventh Circuit, he filed a motion to reconsider before the BIA.130 In 
his motion, he asserted that his case implicated Pereira, §.131 In doing 
so, Herrera-Garcia essentially argued that Pereira should be 
interpreted broadly to include claims outside the stop-time rule context 
to preclude agency’s jurisdiction over his removal proceedings. The 
Board, however, denied his motion on two grounds: (1) that the 
motion was untimely, and that (2) it failed on the merits. Herrera-
Garcia filed a second petition to review the denied motion to 
reconsider he filed.132 
In reviewing his new motion, the Seventh Circuit consolidated his 
two appeals and ultimately rejected Herrera-Garcia’s jurisdictional 
argument.133 Herrera-Garcia explained he delayed filing his motion to 
reconsider because Pereira was still pending and argued that he should 
not have been required to file the motion to reconsider during that 
time.134 However, the Seventh Circuit reasoned he could have 
nonetheless, “raised the issue under consideration in Pereira with the 
Immigration Judge of the Board earlier or at least requested a stay 
until the case was decided.” 135 
There is an argument that the Seventh Circuit, in stating that 
Herrera-Garcia should have filed his motion to reconsider while 
Pereira was pending ignored the fact that, as noted by Justice 
                                                 
129
 Herrera-Garcia v. Barr, 918 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2019). 
130 
Id. at 560. 
131 
Id. at 561. 
132 
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Kennedy in Pereira, at least six courts of appeals before Pereira had 
viewed the stop-time rule differently, and moreover, the Supreme 
Court had interpreted the language to define what constituted a proper 
NTA.136  
IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT- ORTIZ-SANTIAGO V. BARR. 
 
The Seventh Circuit, in a decision authored by Judge Diane 
Wood, disagreed with its sister courts’ narrow interpretation of 
Pereira.137 In Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, the petitioner was a 50-year-old 
Mexican citizen who resided in the United States continuously since 
1999 without legal status.138 In October 2015, the petitioner was 
arrested for driving without a license.139 Shortly after, he received a 
Notice to Appear stating he was removable because he entered the 
United States without being admitted or paroled.140 However, the 
notice did not list any time or date for his appearance, but merely 
stated, as in Pereira that he was to appear before an immigration judge 
in Chicago at a date and time “to be set.”141 Eventually, Ortiz received 
a “Notice of Hearing” indicating he was to appear before an 
immigration judge on November 12, 2015 at 10:30 am.142 
At his hearing, Ortiz-Santiago conceded he was removable, but 
sought cancellation of removal based, in part, on his continuous 
presence in the United States for more than ten years.143 The 
immigration judge denied his cancellation and Ortiz-Santiago 
                                                 
136 
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018).
 
137
 Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019). 
138
 Id. at 958. 
139 
Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d 956, 958.
 
140
 Id. Paroled refers to an extraordinary measure, sparingly utilized to permit 
an otherwise inadmissible unauthorized immigrant to enter the United States for a 
temporary period due to an urgent humanitarian reason or for a significant public 
benefit. An unauthorized immigrant may also request parole from a U.S. government 
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appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.144 While his appeal 
was pending, the Supreme Court decided Pereira. 145 About two 
months after Pereira, but before the Board made its final decision on 
his case, Ortiz filed a motion to remand with the Board, arguing that 
because the notice he received did not include the date and time, it was 
not a proper charging document.146 The Board denied his motion to 
remand and affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.147 Ortiz then 
appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the immigration court did 
not have jurisdiction over his case due to the defective notice.148  
The Seventh Circuit agreed with Ortiz-Santiago that the NTA was 
defective, but denied his petition for review, rejecting his argument 
that the issuance of a defective NTA meant the immigration court had 
not vested jurisdiction over his case.149 The court concluded there was 
no jurisdictional issue on the straightforward basis that Congress has 
not linked the immigration court’s jurisdiction to the notice to appear. 
The court explained this concept as follows:  
 
The fact that the Executive Office for Immigration Review of the 
Department of Justice purported to describe when ‘jurisdiction’ 
vests in a case before an immigration court is neither here nor there. 
. . . While an agency may adopt rules and processes to maintain 
order, it cannot define the scope of its power to hear cases. . . . 
[W]hen the agency creates the rules for its adjudicatory proceedings, 
it must act within the limits that Congress gave it.150 
 
Not considering the question before it one of jurisdiction, the court 
stated defective NTAs instead presented a question of whether a 





 Id. at 958. 
146 









 Id. at 963. 
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claims-processing rule had been violated.151 The court distinguished 
jurisdictional rules claims processing rules relying on Gonzalez v. 
Thaler, where the Supreme Court reasoned “truly jurisdictional rules” 
govern “a court’s adjudicatory authority” while “non-jurisdictional 
ones do not.”152 Applying the Gonzalez principle, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that “the requirement that a Notice include within its four 
corners the time, date , and place of the removal proceedings” should 
not be interpreted to mean  jurisdiction in the “sense that complete 
diversity or the existence of federal question is for a district court.”153 
The court defined a claims-processing rule as one “that seeks to 
promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties 
take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”154  
By referring to the issue in the case as one of  claims-processing 
rather than jurisdictional, the court allowed petitioners the opportunity 
to terminate their case, but only if a timely objection was raised. The 
court stated that if a petitioner failed to raise a timely objection, the 
failure to comply may “be waived or forfeited by the opposing 
party.”155 
Considering the case as one of claim-processing, the court then 
turned to the issues of whether the lack of timely objection constituted 
such forfeiture, whether doing so at the time would have been fruitless 
given the existing law from federal circuit courts, and whether the 
major legal change that the Pereira decision constituted allowed for 
the late raising of such objection.156 The court concluded that there 
was “no reason . . . to relieve Ortiz-Santiago of the forfeiture” because 
in Ortiz-Santiago’s case there were signs a meritorious argument could 
have been raised.”157 





Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). 
153
 Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d 956, 963. 
154
 Id. (citing Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435, (2011)).  
155
 Id. at 963. 
156 
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The court rejected the  Government’s argument that there were 
two NTAs, one being referenced by statute and one in an EOIR 
regulations as “absurd.”158 Furthermore, the court highlighted 
Bermudez-Cota “brushed too quickly over the Supreme Court’s 
rationale in Pereira and tracked the dissenting opinion rather than the 
majority.”159 
While the distinction between a claims-processing rule and a 
jurisdictional one may seem simply definitional, the Supreme Court 
has frequently struggled with distinguishing between the two.160 For 
example, the Court considered whether the “fifteen or more 
employees” standard to hold an employer liable for a Title VII claims 
was jurisdictional and held that it was not.161 The Court, in other cases 
established that claims processing rules are those governing “ the 
presentation and processing of claims.”162 In all cases that reached the 
Supreme Court, the determining factor of whether a rule was one of 
claims-processing or jurisdiction was whether Congress intended to 
treat the rule as jurisdictional.163Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ortiz-
Santiago, several other courts of appeals have adopted its reasoning 
and held that NTA requirements are claims-processing rules.164  
 
V. WHY ORTIZ- SANTIAGO V. BARR WAS INCORRECTLY DECIDED 








 See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (noting that 
 “the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claim-processing rules 
 can be confusing in practice” and that “[c]ourts—including this Court—have 
 sometimes mischaracterized claim processing rules or elements of a cause of 
 action as jurisdictional limitations”). 
161
 See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006). 
162 
Union Pacific R.R. v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. 
of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 61, 71 (2009). 
163
 Hoffman, supra note 5, at 41. 
164
 See Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 688-691 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that 
8 CFR § 1003.14 is a claim-processing rule but upholding two-step process); United 
States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 359-366 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that the regulation 
is an “internal docketing rule” rather than “a limit on an immigration court’s 
‘jurisdiction’ or authority to act”).  
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1. Claiming Pereira Does not Implicate Jurisdiction Defies Sound 
Statutory Interpretation. 
 
As previously mentioned, the argument that a defective NTA does 
not present jurisdictional concerns is largely based on the reading of 
the statute and regulations governing removal proceedings.  8 U.S.C. 
1229 delineates the criteria for the “[i]nitiation of removal 
proceedings.”165 The Section provides that “[i]n removal proceedings . 
. . written notice . . . shall be given in person to the [noncitizen] . . . 
specifying,” among other things “the time and place at which the 
proceedings will be held.”166 Importantly, Section 1229 does not 
address how jurisdiction vests in with the immigration court and, 
therefore, the argument is that “Congress has not ‘directly spoken to’ 
that ‘precise question.”167 Given the ambiguity in Section 1229, 
however, an immigration court’s interpretation of the statute would be 
given deference by a reviewing court and in fact, the agency, answered 
this question in sections 8 C.F.R. §1003.14 and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13.168 
Section 1003.14 provides: “[j]urisdiction vests, and proceedings 
before an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging document is 
filed with the Immigration Court by the Service.169 The statute goes on 
to define a charging document as a “written instrument which initiates 
a proceeding before an immigration judge.”170 The language of 
Section 1003.14 is in line with what the Supreme Court has declared 
to clearly refer to jurisdiction. Without evidence supporting otherwise, 
it is evident the Seventh Circuit simply ignored the clear indication 
Congress intended a notice to appear to serve as a way for the 
immigration court to vest jurisdiction. Congress organized the code 
                                                 
165 
8 U.S.C § 1229 (2006). 
166
 8 U.S.C § 1229(a)(1) (G)(j) (2006). 
167
 United States v. Rivas-Gomez, No. 2:18-cr-566, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 





 Id.at *10. 
170
 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 (1997). 
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logically. The initiation of proceedings must come first, followed by 
the nature and carrying out of the proceedings. Therefore, 8 U.S.C. 
1229 (a) is most reasonably understood to refer to jurisdiction as 
opposed to claims-processing. 
Furthermore, Pereira only having  precedential force for 
cancellation cases  cannot defend the inconsistency that courts’ 
approach necessarily entails: a notice cannot be insufficient solely for 
purposes of triggering the stop-time rule but satisfactory for every 
other purpose. The approach defies reason and cannot be goes against 
long-established rules of statutory construction. 
Considering the statutory interpretation argument, it is not 
surprising advocates for an expansive Pereira reading would want 
Pereira to have subject matter jurisdiction implications.171 At least in 
regards to Article III courts, subject matter jurisdiction issues are 
considered non-waivable, meaning that subject matter jurisdiction can 
be raised at any time during the trial of the case, or even afterwards on 
direct appeal.172 Additionally, federal courts must confirm there is 
subject matter jurisdiction and, if they find it lacking, dismiss sua 
sponte, regardless of whether the parties raise it on their own. 173 
Some scholars, however, consider that treating Pereira as a 
subject matter jurisdiction problem overlooks how defects in subject 
matter jurisdiction of Article III or Article I cannot be attacked 
collaterally.174 Since subject matter jurisdiction cannot be attacked 
collaterally, bringing Pereira challenges could only benefit noncitizens 
with pending or future removal orders. If NTAs, in fact, do not 
implicate subject matter jurisdiction, then the next question should be 
whether an immigration court asserts personal jurisdiction over an 
individual when it serves an NTA on a noncitizen.  
While treating a defective notice issue as one implicating  
personal jurisdiction might allow collateral attacks on final 
                                                 
171




 Id.  
174
 Id.  
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judgements, the argument assumes a defective NTA implicates some 
form of jurisdiction in the first place.175  
Beyond their failure to give proper regard to the clear language in 
the decision, courts that insist Pereira only has precedential force for 
cancellation cases cannot defend the inconsistency that their approach 
necessarily entails: that a notice would be insufficient solely for 
purposes of triggering the stop time rule but satisfactory for every 
other purpose. That approach defies reason and cannot be squared with 
long established rules of statutory construction. 
A claims-processing rule, on the other hand, as discussed earlier, 
is one referring to the way courts carry out their daily administrative 
tasks. Supreme Court precedent in employment law, indicates 
1229(a)’s requirements are more like claims-processing rules and are 
not jurisdictional.176 Specifically, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., a case 
the Seventh Circuit cited in support of its holding that defective 
notices violate claims-processing rules, the Court held employers’ 
liability being limited to fifteen or more employees in Title VII claims 
was not jurisdictional.177 The Arbaugh court further noted the dividing 
line between a jurisdictional and a claims-processing rule is 
determined by looking to whether Congress expressly indicated a rule 
should be treated as jurisdictional.178 
The idea that 1229(a)’s requirements are more like claims-
processing rules is potentially strengthened by the Court’s decision in 
another employment law case decided one year after Pereira. In Fort 
Bend County v. Davis, the Court considered whether Title VII’s charge 
filing precondition to a suit is a jurisdictional question.179 The statute 
                                                 
175
 Id.  
176




See Id. at 515-516 (noting that it the legislature “clearly states that threshold 
limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants 
will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when 
Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts 
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” (footnote 
omitted)(citations omitted)). 
179
 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1846 (2019). 
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clearly states that before a claimant can file a Title VII employment 
discrimination case in court, the complainant must exhaust his 
administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.180 The Court explained that the charge-filing 
requirement, while mandatory, does not implicate the court’s 
jurisdiction. 181 
Proponents’ of a Pereira interpretation that does not include 
jurisdiction have, of course, done their homework and correctly relied 
on Supreme Court precedent delineating what is or is not a claims-
processing rule, even though none of the cases involve statutes or 
regulations governing immigration cases. However, these same 
proponents have failed to reconcile the employment law cases 
distinguishing claims-processing rule violations from jurisdictional 
ones with Supreme Court precedent that is more clearly related to 
Pereira’s interpretation. The Supreme Court  has clearly indicated that 
due to the high stakes involved in the deportation of noncitizens, 
which can be considered the “equivalent of banishment or exile, ”182 
courts have recognized the need to construe statutes in favor of the 
noncitizen.183 Clearly, proponents of allowing immigration courts to 
assert jurisdiction with improper notices are not taking this approach. 
Overall, while the Seventh Circuit correctly ruled the notice 
served on Ortiz-Santiago was defective, its conclusion that this was a 
matter of claims-processing rather than jurisdiction is flawed for at 
least two reasons. First, the court ignored cannons of statutory 
construction requiring the court to consider the title of Section 1229, 
delineating how removal hearings are initiated, as well as well as the 
                                                 
180
 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)). 
181
 Id. at 1849-51. 
182
 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018)(reiterating that 
deportation is “particularly severe penalty,” which may be of greater concern to a 
convicted [noncitizen] than ‘any potential jail sentence.’”). 
183 
Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (finding that in using the term “more than 
once,” the aim of 8 U.S.C.S. § 155(a) was to deport persons who commit a crime 
and are sentenced, commit another crime, and are sentenced again rather than to 
deport a noncitizen who had been convicted of the murder of two different persons 
on one occasion). 
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idea that Courts are to give deference to an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute or regulation.184 Furthermore, the court ignored Supreme Court 
precedent requiring the statute indicating what constitutes a valid NTA 
and the regulation governing when jurisdiction vests, to be read in 
favor of the noncitizen.185 While the Seventh Circuit’s decision has 
provided immigration attorneys with an avenue to challenge 
immigrants’ removal hearings, it should nonetheless reconsider its 
reasoning as this could  lead to a slippery slope in which our 
government is allowed to continue violating immigrants’ due process 
rights. Unless Congress changes the governing statutes or the Supreme 
Court overrules Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, where the court held statutes 
should be read in favor of the noncitizen186  
 
2. The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on the “Gonzalez principle” is 
improper.  
 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the “line of authority” 
upon which it relied to reach this conclusion “arose in the context of 
the courts rather than agencies” but nevertheless found “the principle a 
useful one here as well.”187 There is reason to doubt whether the 
“Gonzalez principle” applies here, to an agency rather than an Article 
III court. 
 The Supreme Court,  in City of Arlington v. F.C.C., addressed 
the question of “whether a court must defer under Chevron to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the 
scope of the agency's statutory authority (that is, its jurisdiction).” 188 
The Court ultimately decided a court must defer to an agency’s 
interpretation . To answer the question before it, the Supreme Court 
noted the meaningful differences between “jurisdictional” and 
                                                 
184
 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). 
185
 See Fort Bend County, supra note 180, at 1846. 
186
 Id.  
187
 Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 963. 
188
 City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 296-97 (2013).  
33
Gomez: Jurisdiction Means Jurisdiction Not Claims-Processing: the Sevent
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
“nonjurisdicitonal questions in the judicial context, but not necessarily 
for agencies. The Court also noted that “[t]he misconceptipn that there 
are for Chevron purposes separate ‘jurisdictional’ questions on which 
no deference is due derives perhaps, from a reflexive extension to 
agencies of the very real division between the jurisdictional and 
nonjurisdictional that is applicable to the courts.” 189 Essentially, the 
Supreme Court explained that “[w]here Congress has established a 
clear line the agency cannot go beyond it; and where Congress has 
established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the 
ambiguity will fairly allow.” 190 In applying the latter rule, a court 
should not question whether the question presented is “jurisdictional.” 
191 For if the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute,’ that is the end of the matter.”192 
 Here, the  relevant statutes sections 1229 and 1229(a) are 
ambiguous as to when jurisdiction vests with an immigration 
court. While the Seventh Circuit disagrees, the Attorney General filled 
a gap to address an ambiguity  in Section 1229 with the promulgation 
of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13, 1003.14, and 1239.1. There is no reason why 
the Attorney General interpreting the commencement of immigration 
proceedings as a jurisdictional question is not “a permissible 
construction of the statute.”193 Therefore, because this issue relates 
specifically to the Attorney General’s “interpretation of a statutory 
ambiguity concern[ing] the scope of [his] authority (that is, its 
jurisdiction,” the conclusion that jurisdiction vests when a charging 
document is filed with the immigration court properly follows. 194  
 While it is true there has been disagreement and confusion over 
what truly constitutes a jurisdictional rule, the Supreme Court has not 
                                                 
189
 Id. at 297. 
190




 Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). 
193
 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
194
 City of Arlington, supra, note 185, at 296-97. 
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addressed the nature of NTA’s in immigration law. Pereira only 
addressed whether the NTA triggered the stop-time rule and did not 
specifically state whether the NTA implicates jurisdiction. Therefore, 
despite other circuits agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, until the 
Supreme Court reviews whether NTAs assert jurisdiction, the 
argument that the issue is one of jurisdiction as opposed to claims-
processing remains viable.  
 Recent Seventh Circuit decisions have followed Ortiz-Santiago in 
ruling that incomplete notices are claims-processing violations.195 
However, at least one court has considered Ortiz-Santiago’s reliance 
on Gonzalez misguided because Gonzalez involved a jurisdictional 
challenge in an Article III court and not an agency as in Ortiz-
Santiago.196 While the one court to criticize the Seventh Circuit’s 
holding that defective notices are the result of claims-processing rules, 
and not jurisdiction, was a district court, the analysis makes clear the 
distinction between a claims-processing rule and jurisdictional one are 
not clear.   
In United States v. Rivas-Gomez, the petitioner, a citizen of 
Mexico, entered the United States without authorization on June of 
1997.197 On June 6, 2002, Rivas-Gomez received a Notice to 
Appear.198 On or around June 13, 2002, Rivas-Gomez received a 
“Notice of Hearing in Removal Proceedings” indicating that Rivas-
Gomez had been scheduled for MASTER hearing before the 
Immigration Court on July 15, 2002 at 8:30 am at a courtroom in 
Lancaster, California.199 Mr. Rivas-Gomez was ordered removed at 
that hearing, but then he re-entered the country.200 The Government 
                                                 
195
 See supra note 165. 
196
 United States v. Rivas-Gomez, No. 2:18-cr-566, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
111931, at *1 (D. Utah July 3, 2019). 
197 






Id. at *19. 
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alleged that Mr. Rivas-Gomez’ re-entry after being removed was 
illegal.201 Mr. Rivas -Gomez argued for the dismissal of the illegal re-
entry charge because the charge was based on the 2002 notice to 
appear that could not vest jurisdiction when it did not include all of the 
information necessary to do so.202 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah noted 
how the Seventh Circuit had conceded it was relying on a line of 
authority arising “in the context of the courts rather than agencies.” 203 
The district court continued its critique of Ortiz-Santiago noting how 
the court did not provide any statutory or case precedent for relying on 
that same rationale.204 The district court held the issue presented was 
one of jurisdiction and not claims-processing, relying on City of 
Arlington.205  
 
2. Practical Implications  
 
The consequences of Pereira, the Seventh Circuit failed to 
consider in Ortiz-Santiago are severe: in the months following the 
Pereira decision, the backlog of immigration cases grew from 700,000 
to over 800,000.206  It is very possible that by holding the issue is one 
of claims-processing, the incomplete notices will continue to be 
distributed and therefore further increase this backlog. Since almost 
one hundred percent of the cases were initiated by invalid notices to 
appear there is an argument that they should all be terminated for lack 
of jurisdiction.207 
                                                 
201
 Id. at *2. 
202
 Id. at *2-3 (citations and quotations omitted). 
203




 Id. at *15-16. 
206
 Compare Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRACT IMMIGRATION, 
https/perma.cc/BND9-RNGG(data up to May 2018), with 
http://trac.syr.edu/phtptools/immigraiton/court_backlog/[https://perma.cc/2E2R-
73NP9](data through November 2018). 
207
 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111(citing transcript). 
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To address the government’s potential concern: while  it may 
seem that all non-citizens would immediately be relieved from 
removal, it would be relatively easy for the Department of Homeland 
Security to issue new, complete notices to appear.208 The fill- in the 
blanks information on the form-including the respondent’s name, 
address, and why they are subject to removal can easily be copied onto 
complete notices to appear that comply with the requirements listed in 
Pereira.209 In fact there is a computer system that would make this 
even easier.210 However, as previously mentioned, these arguments 
have been ignored by all circuits that have reviewed Pereira 
jurisdictional claims.  
Therefore, what is left for immigration attorneys to do on the 
jurisdictional question is to attempt to distinguish as best they can the 
case they are presenting to the judge from those decided by several 
circuits already. For example, in some of the federal court decisions, 
the NTA at issue did not include the time and date of the hearing but 
did include the place.211 Therefore, an attorney could argue that 
lacking the place of hearing was not at issue in Pereira and should not 
                                                 
208
 Rivas-Gomez, No. 2:18-cr-566, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111931, at *16-17. 
209




 Some U.S. courts of appeals decisions do explicitly state that the 
respondent argued the NTA was defective for not including the time or place of the 
hearing. See Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2019) reh'g denied 
(July 18, 2019) petition for cert. pending No.19-510 (filed Oct. 16, 2019); Ali v. 
Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019); Nkomo v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 
930 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2019). None of the cases, however, discusses the 
immigration court address requirement in 8 CFR § 1003.15 so it does not appear that 
the noncitizens in these cases argued that the regulations do require the NTA to list 
the place of the hearing for jurisdiction to vest even if they do not require the NTA to 
list the time and date. On other hand, other U.S. court of appeals state that the 
noncitizen argued that the NTA was defective for not including “the time and date” 
but are silent as to place. For example, Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160 
(9th Cir. 2019) petition for cert. pending, No. 19-475 (filed Oct. 7, 2019) says, 
“Importantly, the regulation does not require that the time and date of proceedings 
appear in the initial notice.” See also Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 688691 (5th 
Cir. 2019); United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 359-366 (4th Cir. 2019); Soriano-
Mendosa v. Barr, 768 F. App’x 796, 802 (10th Cir. 2019).  
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ortiz-Santiago has 
unquestionably helped immigrant advocates terminate the removal 
proceedings of many immigrants. However, a problem remains with 
the framework the Seventh Circuit has set forth. As this article has 
discussed, the court incorrectly assumed that the jurisdictional 
argument is completely implausible. Secondly, the court’s reliance on 
a case pertaining to Article III courts rather than agencies, such as an 
immigration court, is improper. Lastly, in easily dismissing the issues 
as one of claims processing, the court fails to account for the practical 
implications its decision will have.  
The difference between a claims-processing rule and jurisdictional 
one may seem to be a mere technicality, however, the distinction 
matters. It matters because the distinction could determine whether a 
noncitizen could challenge a government’s error at virtually any 
stage of litigation, or within a given time period.  
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